Consciousness Vs Awareness

[Anand]

Hi,
I have always been intrigued by the question of consciousness but have always found myself unable to really distinguish between awareness and consciousness. I was wondering what some of your thoughts on this were?

[Steffen]

Hey,
as a "cognitive scientist" (if you can call me like that without me having a degree) it is really a shame to admit that I have really no idea about that. At least I have no reliable sources for anything like that.
But I thought about it and came to this guess:
I'd say consciousness is like "consciously perceiving s.th. and to be able to actively think about it". Awareness could be a weaker notion in that sense that even animals can be aware of s.th. like an injury or the presence of a predator (and not thinking about how to flee the best way but to rely on instincts). Would you ascribe consciousness to an animal? Humans perhaps can be aware of another person being in the same room. In some sense this could be unconsciously (you don't think about it - you just feel and "know" it without having perceived the person through eyes or ears).
This is what came to my mind, when I thought about your question. But surely this is only food for thought...

[George]

Hi!
ummmmm nice question. Here I will define three words that most of the time give rise to misunderstandings
Consciousness
The word conscious (cum=together with, and scire=knowing), so it consists of serially time-ordered and organized perception of the self and environment. Eg, I'm conscious that I'm sitting in a chair writing in my computer. It's a little bit clear if you think this concept with the opposite unconscious.
Awareness
Knowing that something exists, or having knowledge or experience of a particular thing.
Attention
Focus your conscious in a particular action or sensorial perception... Eg, I'm conscious that I'm in my room focus in what my friend tell me in the MSN but I didn't pay attention to what my mom said, because I was focus in my activity.

hope it help

George

[durtnowski]

Maybe we are all not as conscious as we would like to think. A lot of it comes down to the pesky definition. So, is consciousness the result of being aware of many things? Does consciousness exist in degrees? Would a dog be somewhat conscious, a primate even more so? Just because they may not know what a chair is, certainly they could be aware that they are sitting in one.

Is a tree aware of sunlight? Most would not think so, but it responds to it. Is human consciousness merely working in the same kind of feedback loop with nature as a tree... just with fancier instruments, more advanced bio-technology.

I am not sure George's chair sentence works out very well. I could be considered to be aware that I am sitting in a chair, as well as conscious of the fact.

It was Ayn Rand who said,"If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness."

In fact, what we perceive is a tiny sliver of what is really going on around us. Even within the limits of our own biological structures to perceive the environment around us, we still filter out a great deal of information lest we be overwhelmed. When you bring in the philosophers, you end up with the sad reality that, in the true epistemological sense, you can never really know anything (even though we can be pretty damn sure in many cases), and really we *feel* that we are right and correct without ever being able to know it. So, in the clutches of cognitive dissonance, the scientist will always find himself at a disadvantage when faced with the *feeling* of certainty by overzealous religious people.

I never really felt that quantum physics played much of a role in the consciousness of an individual, though I would love to hear any ideas on how quantum inderterminancy could possibly play a role in how we put information together. The easiest answer is that we are not conscious at all, merely aware on a limited level. Our thoughts are determined by material changes in the brain, which are determined by genetics, socialization, and the end resulting tiny little structures that all work together to push us along according to what we *feel* is best.

[ninecat]

I really think that when we talk about human consciousness, we mean (or most intend to mean?) that we have the ability not just to be aware of a fact, but to relflect on it. Trees respond to the sun because their biology is manufactured in such a way that certain cells have characteristics which enable them to have that role. We have cells that basically function in the same way, without our awareness, but the difference between human beings and trees is that we can think about our experiences, and we can make decisions based on reasoning. This is the difference between us and, say, a cat, as well. (As far as we can tell.)

I don't know if or how quantum physics plays into consciousness, but I feel almost that it must somehow. I think that what is happening at such an infinitesmally small level, chemically and otherwise, has something to do with how we perceive things, and how we can reflect on them. I also think that it (maybe superstrings?) has something to do with our mind, in general, and possibly intuition, but that's a topic for another day, probably.

Bria

[ChantiPDM]

Here's a link to Christof Koch's lectures considering consciousness studies, particularly according to visual perception: http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns120/videos.php
Christof Koch is a capacity in his field and devoted his entire career to this topic. He collaborated with Fracis Crick (who was co-discoverer of the DNA double helix) to find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.

Another link for durtnowski and everyone else who is interested in the relation between quantum mechanics and higher brain functions: http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/306/1/561.pdf

[Lambizzel]

Ninecats response impresses me the most, for this distinction is often not specified, if you take a look at the literature in science, and in philosophy.

I also think that conciousness is in some sense, pretty much stronger than awareness, and above that, awareness is nothing more than a neccessary condition for conciousness, if we talk about somethink I would like to call "concious perception" where we are at least aware of a perception.

I mean the following: Awareness means that you are certain about having some sort of perception. Therefore, awareness always refers to some sort of perceptual apperception, or perception.

That´s why we use to say that we are aware OF sth.

Conciousness is really more than that. Conciousness is a personal state, which helps us to understand ourselves as human beings with several propositions, wishes, desires, beliefs and so on.

Where awareness is just the knowledge about a certain perception, which is measurable in general, conciousness is the ability of being aware of more than anything which is measurable:

Conciousness is the awareness of a psychological holistic construct of ourself, which exceeds the biological measurable components, conciousness is the result and the self reflection of the neuronal framework which keeps us together.

[Andrea]

Hi,
I read this discussion, it is very interesting. In my opinion, the big problem is to define "consciousness" without using the expression "consciousness". Therfore, I think it's not usefull to explain it with situations were we are uncoscious, although everybody knows what we mean.
What do you think about the following definition: A conscious perception is one that produces a memory trace, in contrast, there are perceptions we can be aware of and probably also react to but if anyone asks us later, we cannot remember.
I'd like to hear your opinion.

[swami]

I found this interesting. It discusses "I-ness" as opposed to awareness and makes some interesting comments on the notion of the "hard problem" when it comes to reducing cosnsciousness to the brain. This is followed by an out of the box way of looking at the issue. When it comes to understanding consciousness, it seems reasonable to think outside of the box. from Cartesian dualism, to property dualism, to functional monisim, etc. no definitive answer is at hand.

First an excerpt on the "hard problem" followed by a link to the entire article.

"How hard is the ‘hard problem’?"

Chalmers places the ‘hard problem’ within ‘the puzzle of conscious experience’. If we agree that the problem of consciousness is basically the problem of ‘I’ having a continuos experience in spite of ‘my’ knowledge/ignorance about the causal connections, the puzzle becomes that of the conscious experiencer rather than of the experience. To the question whether emphasis on conscious experiencer will add anything new to the existing problem, the answer is a firm ‘yes’. The ‘hard problem’ gets harder when it comes to the experiencer who has the conscious experience. Hence the question ‘who is having the conscious experience?’ is more significant than ‘what is it like to have a conscious experience?’ Despite the personal and subjective nature of consciousness a reducibility is possible in the realm of ‘I-consciousness’ which speaks more about its pervasive oneness than pluralistic existence. And also a simple “Theory of Everything” having a set of physical laws and another set of psychophysical laws can eventually explain only the apparent schisms evident in any experience. The problem becomes complex when the relation between the experience and the experiencer is asked for. It is plausible that the Theory of Everything will have to belong to another level of existence, since it has to stand distinct yet abridge physical processes and conscious experiences. An approach to consciousness by way of a non-reductionistic divide of ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems is more of physical than phenomenological import. If it is a problem of devising a theory to link the mechanism and its cognitive function, then non-reductionism initiated will have to remain rigid indirectly begging the first question.
I will argue that in an approach favouring three levels of reality such as (i)physical process leading to experience, (ii)experience of having a conscious experience and (iii)fundamental laws linking the former two levels, the ‘hardness’ of consciousness will have to be always backed up by non-subjective theories compartmentalizing the problem of consciousness in three closed linear systems. Functional and operational descriptions of material systems are not readily translatable into properties owing to irreducible complexities. It is known that different complex systems manifest utterly different behavior. To make it more difficult, there cannot be one to one simulation of properties and behaviors at various levels. It is agreed upon by many that we ‘choose’ to see. Manifest properties depend upon the observables we choose to look at. Another difficulty making it harder will be to account for the reversibility of physical processes and conscious experience as Chalmers himself suggests. Can a physical process lead to a conscious experience or can a conscious experience simulate corresponding physical structures? This brings back the ancient puzzle whether the egg or the chicken is first. Hence it will be unbecoming for this neo-reductionistic approach to claim that it will “one day [may] resolve the greatest mystery of the mind”.

Again, here is the link to the entire article.
http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_menon_sankar_frameset.htm

[Steffen]

Hi,
I read this discussion, it is very interesting. In my opinion, the big problem is to define "consciousness" without using the expression "consciousness". Therfore, I think it's not usefull to explain it with situations were we are uncoscious, although everybody knows what we mean.
What do you think about the following definition: A conscious perception is one that produces a memory trace, in contrast, there are perceptions we can be aware of and probably also react to but if anyone asks us later, we cannot remember.
I'd like to hear your opinion.

Taking memory into account is important (now that I think of it). Without memory consciousness could not work properly. Try to reflect on a perception you just had without remembering it. Pretty impossible, isn't it?
But I don't completely agree with the awareness part of your idea. Or let's say, perhaps, I just don't get it or something is missing. What is definitely missing is the definition of "being aware of s.th.". I mean, exactly this is the core point of this discussion (among consciousness, of course). As Andrea pointed out before: the big problem is to define "consciousness" without using the expression "consciousness". The same applies for awareness.
Furthermore, what exactly do you mean by reacting to a perception we are only aware of without having it in our consciousness? As soon as we actively react to a perception we get conscious about it. Even reflexes leave a memory trace (you can talk about it afterwards).
What comes to my mind, is only the unconscious reaction to, e.g., increased blood pressure, regulating digestion or s.th. like that within our body. Our brain is aware of (if it can be) these perceptions insofar that it reacts to them without "telling us". But I don't think that this helps us in our discussion, because this works for (unconscious) animals or bacteria as well.
Last but not least, what memory exactly do you mean? Only long-term, or short-term or something else? Does sensory memory already count as memory for your idea?

Anyway, mentioning memory gives a new twist to the discussion.

[Andrea]

Hi Steffen,
you are right, taking the memory into account doesn't make the problem much simpler. My idea is: talking about consciousness and awareness, one has to seperate very thoroughly between the feeling we have and the physical state we are in.
Every perception has two sides, a physical one (stimulus, neuronal activity...) and the subjective side (I saw the colour blue, I thought about this person...). I think, if we want to define consciousness, we want to know, which neuronal process is responsible for making us "feel" conscious. We all are pretty sure, how it feels to be conscious, but how can we proof someone elses consciousness? This is how memory came into my mind. If we want to know, if someone had a conscious perception of this or that we can only ask him "afterwards". So, if he or she "remembers" this perception, the person will say, it was conscious.
I thought about short term and longterm memory, too. First, there is no strict separation between these types of memory, second, you are right, if a perception was in the short term memory, the person will not remember if it was conscious or not. This is a problem.
The other thing is: I don't think, we can claim in general that lower organisms are unconscious, did you ask them?
There are a lot of stimuli, our body reacts to that are not in the memory later. Again, of course there is the short-term-memory-problem. But asking ourselves, was this a conscious perception of mine, always concerns the memory.
Your brain gets a lot of information, that don't come into your mind. But they are still included in our behavior. I would say, these are information we are aware of.
The problem consciousness/awareness, has to be treated with a lot of care. It is easy to mix up physical state and feeling, and also the use of consciousness and awareness in our language makes it more difficult.
I'm happy, someone answered, it's so much fun to discuss this problem. Hope to hear from you again,
cheers.

[Steffen]

First of all, I like your idea concerning awareness.

Your brain gets a lot of information, that don't come into your mind. But they are still included in our behavior.

You have adressed the problem of qualia... well, that's hard stuff... I don't want to discuss this right here. But I opened a thread for the philosophical discussion of qualia referring to Thomas Nagel and his text "What is it like to be a bat" http://www.neuroscience-forum.net/philosophy_of_mind/qualia-t131.0.html
I like this discussion as much as you do, but unfortunately I don't have to add much to what you wrote. I really hate this problem you come across in all sciences concerning the brain: it's unclear and unknown. Hopefully we will come to new ideas in the near future. I mean, that's our job. We chose it
btw: I did not definitely deny animal consciousness. I often reduce things to what the majority of non-neuroscientists believe to make my idea clear. I know this is a problem of mine, but sometimes I just do it, sorry for that. At least I'm pretty sure you can deny bacterial consciousness without asking them (hey, they don't have a brain at all).
To sum this all up, we have two major problems here: we need to get an idea of the feeling (qualia) and second, we have to find the connection between the physical state and the feeling. In the end we should be able to prove someone else's consciousness... Just wishful thinking for the next decades, I think.
I'm no fan of this philosophical stuff. So I will be very happy for all scientific papers or provable thoughts and ideas.
Perhaps someone else has an idea for the short-term memory?

[Steffen]

Now that I read my text again, I get the impression that I pretty much drifted away from the actual discussion