A theory of consciousness

[George]

A the moment seems really difficult to find a theory explaining the conscious fact.
Does consciousness requires behavior?
Does consciousness depend in cytoskeletal proteins?
Is it an illusion?
At the moment we are just giving an approach to this complex function, we can't affirm that it completely depends on one of the concepts mentioned above.
Most of these are right, but there is a point we are missing, a interaction between concepts and theories. We should work like the brain actually does, integrating most of the afferences to perceive the nature of an event 

[Thi]

Hi rapitors,

thanks for starting a post on this intriguing topic. When you say "interaction   between concepts and theories" - which theories and concepts are you precisely referring to?
Thitus

[George]

Hi!
When I wrote "interaction between concepts and theories" I meant that not only scientists should work explaining consciousness, we should to interact with different areas like philosophy, quantum physics, and of course science (not only neuroscientists hehe). We still don't know many things about how the brain works. That's why we should share comments with different areas about this topic.

Here I attached a nice link, hope u like it
http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_events/symposia/brain_mind/brain_mind_vid_archive.html

George

[madaloc]

Does consciousness depend in cytoskeletal proteins?
Is it an illusion?

this question is widely open within the scientific society, but it seems that this problem has usual explanations: articles on the theme linked to involvement of cytoskeletal proteins are available in the Web.. so.. for example Alzheimer's disease, don't you suppose that a loss of consciousness is caused including ability to deposit APP.. so.. do you have any questions? 

[Lambizzel]

Hi

well, first of all we sdould take a look at the neccessary conditions for building up a theory of consciousness, from a philosophical point of view (which certainly should be combined with biochemical evidence, but that´s not my main topic, because I am a philosopher )

1. perception (Of course we do not want to speak about imagination or illusion, therefore, we should specify)

2. awareness: This point is much stronger, for it claims that having perception isn´t identical, or even enough, because conciousness requires at least a knowlegde about the content of your perception, this means, precisely a meta - knowlegde, maybe theory - laden from background theory, maybe not (in fact I do strongly believe in this theory - ladeness, for this is nothing more, from one point of view, than what we can call neuronal networks, or "heuristics"
awareness means, a knowedge about your kknowledge, the ability of transcendental viewing on your own perception.

Now the questiona rises:

Is consciousness more than the awareness (for it may seem that consciousness is a condition for awareness, not the other way round)

[Kelby]

At the moment we are just giving an approach to this complex function, we can't affirm that it completely depends on one of the concepts mentioned above.
Most of these are right, but there is a point we are missing, a interaction between concepts and theories. We should work like the brain actually does, integrating most of the afferences to perceive the nature of an event 

This is the road many neuroscientist are taking.  Just take a look at M.R. Benneet and P.M.S. Hacker in their controversial book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience."  Patricia Churchland also recognizes the need to pair philosophical insight and understanding with empircal study.  I believe people are doing just what you are proposing.  It is a laudable effort on all fronts, but the issues of what such a unified theory of mind may look like are still prevelant as you noted.  The brain is still very much a mystery, and most of our ignorance is due to the lack of philosophical understanding and lack of knowledge from other fields.
    So I agree with you.  A type of conducive pairing of neuroscience with something is necessary.  That just means there will need to be a lot of re-learning and re-re-re-learning. haha

[manisha]

Dear all I don't know why but I can't initiate a new post 
Can anyone help me post my query on my behalf?? Actually I am looking for TPH2 antibody urgently and wanted to check whether anybody has used it before?? From which company I should buy?
TPH2 (Tryptophan hydroxylase-2) is serotonergic neuronal marker.
Please excuse me for posting in this section.

[swami]

I posted this on another thread but it may be more appropriate to post it here.

I found this interesting. It discusses "I-ness" as opposed to awareness and makes some interesting comments on the notion of the "hard problem" when it comes to reducing cosnsciousness to the brain.

First an excerpt on the "hard problem" followed by a link to the entire article.

"How hard is the ‘hard problem’?"

Chalmers places the ‘hard problem’ within ‘the puzzle of conscious experience’. If we agree that the problem of consciousness is basically the problem of ‘I’ having a continuos experience in spite of ‘my’ knowledge/ignorance about the causal connections, the puzzle becomes that of the conscious experiencer rather than of the experience. To the question whether emphasis on conscious experiencer will add anything new to the existing problem, the answer is a firm ‘yes’. The ‘hard problem’ gets harder when it comes to the experiencer who has the conscious experience. Hence the question ‘who is having the conscious experience?’ is more significant than ‘what is it like to have a conscious experience?’ Despite the personal and subjective nature of consciousness a reducibility is possible in the realm of ‘I-consciousness’ which speaks more about its pervasive oneness than pluralistic existence. And also a simple “Theory of Everything” having a set of physical laws and another set of psychophysical laws can eventually explain only the apparent schisms evident in any experience. The problem becomes complex when the relation between the experience and the experiencer is asked for. It is plausible that the Theory of Everything will have to belong to another level of existence, since it has to stand distinct yet abridge physical processes and conscious experiences. An approach to consciousness by way of a non-reductionistic divide of ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems is more of physical than phenomenological import. If it is a problem of devising a theory to link the mechanism and its cognitive function, then non-reductionism initiated will have to remain rigid indirectly begging the first question.
I will argue that in an approach favouring three levels of reality such as (i)physical process leading to experience, (ii)experience of having a conscious experience and (iii)fundamental laws linking the former two levels, the ‘hardness’ of consciousness will have to be always backed up by non-subjective theories compartmentalizing the problem of consciousness in three closed linear systems. Functional and operational descriptions of material systems are not readily translatable into properties owing to irreducible complexities. It is known that different complex systems manifest utterly different behavior. To make it more difficult, there cannot be one to one simulation of properties and behaviors at various levels. It is agreed upon by many that we ‘choose’ to see. Manifest properties depend upon the observables we choose to look at. Another difficulty making it harder will be to account for the reversibility of physical processes and conscious experience as Chalmers himself suggests. Can a physical process lead to a conscious experience or can a conscious experience simulate corresponding physical structures? This brings back the ancient puzzle whether the egg or the chicken is first. Hence it will be unbecoming for this neo-reductionistic approach to claim that it will “one day [may] resolve the greatest mystery of the mind”.

Again, here is the link to the entire article.
http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_menon_sankar_frameset.htm